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THE TRAGEDY OF (IGNORING) THE INFORMATION
SEMICOMMONS: A CULTURAL ENVIRONMENTAL
PERSPECTIVE

Robert Cunningham'

ABSTRACT

The second enclosure movement critique is familiar theoretical
territory for scholars concerned with the creeping maximalist impulse of
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs). Just as the first enclosure movement
relating to real property created controversies concerning social contract
and the advertised efficiencies of private real property, so too these
concerns are echoed within the context of IPRs. This paper employs the
emergent discourse of cultural environmentalism so as to diagnose and
resolve IPR issues evident within the information environment. Cultural
environmentalism borrows, begs, and steals analytical frameworks from
environmentalism, such as those relating to the commons, public choice
theory, welfare economics, and ecology. After proffering a brief
overview of the second enclosure movement critique and cultural
environmentalism, this paper settles on the analytical framework of the
commons. Specifically, it is the commons-related tragedies such as the
tragedy of the commons, the tragedy of the anticommons, and the
tragedy of (ignoring) the information semicommons, that provide insight
into critical efficiency concerns that lie dormant within the information
environment. Ultimately, the paper argues that to ignore the benefits
accruing from the dynamic interaction between private and commons

1. Assistant Professor, The University of Western Australia. The author acknowledges the
support and mentorship of Professor Brian Fitzgerald (Queensland University of Technology).
Support was also forthcoming from Assistant Professor Sarah Murray (The University of Western
Australia) and Assistant Professor Rebecca Faugno (The University of Western Australia), as was
mentorship from Associate Professor Ana Vrdoljak (University of Western Australia), Professor
Peter Drahos (Australian National University) and Professor Megan Richardson (Melbourne
University).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2010

1

Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 4 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 1

AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL

uses of information is a tragedy-the tragedy of (ignoring) the
information semicommons.
A b stract ............................................................................................
I. Introduction .......................................................................
II. Part One: The Second Enclosure Movement .....................
III. Part Two: Cultural Environmentalism ...............................
IV. Part Three: The Commons and Related Tragedies ..........
A. Information Ecology .................................................
B. The Tragedy of the Commons .................................
C. The Tragedy of the Anticommons ............................
D. The Tragedy of (Ignoring) the Information
Sem icomm ons ...........................................................
V . C onclusion ......................................................................

1
2
3
9
14
16
20
23
26
32

I. INTRODUCTION

Within the information environment, there is no past or pending
singular grand disaster. The issues are many and cumulative. For some,
concern about the information environment stems from United States
Patent number 6,004,596 for a "Sealed Crustless Sandwich," which is
effectively a patent for a peanut butter and jelly sandwich; for others, the
concern stems from patents relating to Australian smokebush or Indian
Turmeric or human genomes or perhaps algorithms. 2 Yet for others still,
it is the general erosion of copyright exceptions or trademark expansion.
Many are affected. Concerns raised by librarians, biotechnologists,
software engineers, and parodists exemplify the broad range of issues at
stake within the information environment
Cultural environmentalism is an emergent discourse that seeks to
borrow, beg, and steal analytical frameworks from contemporary
enviromnentaism--such as those relating to the commons, public
choice theory, welfare economics, and ecology-so as to diagnose and
resolve issues within the information environment.4 After a brief
overview of the second enclosure movement critique and the emergent

2.

JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND, at ix

(2008) [hereinafter BOYLE, PUBLIC DOMAIN] (discussing peanut butter and jelly sandwich patent in
the United States); Stephen Gray, Vampires Round the Campfire: Indigenous Intellectual Property
Rights in Australia,22 ALTERNATIVE L. J. 60, 60-61 (1997) (discussing the Australian Smokebush);
VANDANA SHIVA, PROTECT OR PLUNDER?: UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 6263 (2001) (discussing Indian Turmeric).
3. BOYLE, PUBLIC DOMAIN, supra note 2, at 239.
4. Infra Part 111.
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discourse of cultural environmentalism, this paper focuses on the
analytical framework of the commons and related tragedy discourse;
namely, it focuses on the tragedy of the commons, the tragedy of the
anticommons, and the tragedy of (ignoring) the information
semicommons. In so doing, the paper advocates the importance of
recognizing the dynamic efficiencies of private and commons uses of
information as per semicommons theory so as to move beyond the false
dichotomy of the public/private information ownership debate. In the
context of contemporary information ownership and regulation, the
paper submits that private and commons uses must be thought of, at least
in some instances, as symbiotic rather than mutually exclusive.
II. PART ONE: THE SECOND ENCLOSURE MOVEMENT

In the fifteenth century, the structure of land ownership in England
began a rapid transformation. 5 Drawing upon a variety of methods, the
aristocracy appropriated for private ownership land that had been
traditionally held in common. 6 This was referred to as the "enclosure
movement," whereby the right to exclude was utilized to convert the
default form of land tenure from commons property to private property.7
Enclosure has continued up until this day, albeit contemporary limitedcommons and semicommons analysis suggests a more complex picture 8
Boyle eloquently describes the first enclosure movement in "The
Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public
Domain" by depicting the controversial nature of real property rights. 9
He begins his critique by drawing upon a well-known poem that begins:
5.

Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the DigitalAnticommons, 91 CAL.

L. REV. 439, 500 (2003).
6. JAMES YELLING, COMMON FIELD AND ENCLOSURE IN ENGLAND 1450-1850, at 7-9
(1977).

7. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (characterizing "the right to
exclude others" as "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commons
characterized as property").
8. See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., PERSPECTIVES ON

PROPERTY LAW, at xviii (2d ed. 1995) (citing a shared dormitory room as common property);
Hunter, supra note 5, at 500 n.419 (citing Robert Ellickson, Propertyin Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315,
1394-95 (1993) (noting that the majority of Americans live in limited-commons property
environments within multiperson households)); Henry Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and
Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 160 (2000) [hereinafter Smith, Semicommon
Property Rights] (drawing attention to the fact that open fields and enclosed fields coexisted for

centuries).
9. James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public
Domain, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 34-35 (2003) [hereinafter Boyle, The Second Enclosure
Movement].
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[T]he law locks up the man or woman
Who steals the goose from off the common
But leaves the greater villain loose
Who steals the common from off the goose.10

Boyle's depiction of real property rights within the context of the
first enclosure movement examines social contract questions regarding
the legitimacy of state power and the creation of incentives that are
seemingly inherent within those rights." "Seemingly," as empirical
evidence does not always support a direct correlation between property
rights and increasing production.12 The classic "tragedy of the
commons" (discussed below) does not always eventuate in practice.
Property rights concerning both real property and intellectual
property remain at center stage in contemporary theoretical discussion
relating to economic efficiency and justice. Property definitions and
descriptions abound from Hobbes to Locke to Blackstone to Hume to
Proudhon.' 3 Although the definition of property differs depending on
the context, at its simplest, Benkler describes property as a "cluster of
background rules" that determine what resources each of us has when

10. Id. at 33.
11. Id. at 34-35.
12. Most of the empirical evidence relates to agricultural production. See, e.g., Robert Allen,
The Efficiency and DistributionalConsequences of Eighteenth Century Enclosures, 92 ECON. J.
937, 950-51 (1982); ROBERT ALLEN, ENCLOSURE AND THE YEOMAN (1992); cf Michael Turner,
English Open Fields andEnclosures: Retardation or ProductivityImprovements, 46 J. ECON. HIST.
669, 687-88 (1986).
13. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 18 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996)
(1651) (explaining that property rights are the subject of sovereign discretion, but that the sovereign
is bound to offer the citizens certain protections relating to property ownership such as providing a
judicial system of resolution in matters concerning property conflict); JOHN LOCKE, SECOND
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 47-51 (C. B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publishing Co. Inc. 1980)
(1690) (casting property within the social contract context whereby freedom is traded in for certain
securities stemming from impartial sovereign protection of property); WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 3 (Chicago University Press 1979) (1765) (defining
property as the "sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external
things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe"); DAVID
HUME, MORAL PHILOSOPHY 99-101 (Geoffrey Sayre-McCord ed. 2006) (advocating a pragmatic
view of property whereby property ownership is adopted as a means of dividing limited resources
but rejecting the social contract perspective of property); PIERRE-JOSEPH PROUDHON, WHAT IS
PROPERTY?: AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLE OF RIGHT AND GOVERNMENT 44 (George Woodcock
ed., Dover Publications 1970) (1840) (making the important distinction between possession and
property). For a critical, Indigenous perspective, see Jane Anderson & Kathy Bowrey, The
Imaginary Politics of Access to Knowledge: Whose Cultural Agendas are Being Advanced?,
AUSTRALIAN

INTELL.

PROP.

L.

RES.

13

(2006),

available

at

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/AIPLRes/2006/13.html.
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we come into relations with others and, no less important, what "having"
these others.' 4

or "lacking" a resource entails in our relations with
From the early days of intellectual property rights (IPRs), critics
have voiced concerns about the broad-ranging nature of the -saidrights. 5
In the United States, the founding generation of intellectuals had been
nurtured on the philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment and the history
of the struggle against royal monopolies.' 6 They were not against IPRs
per se, but they repeatedly referred to the necessity to restrict both its
term and its scope so as to avoid low quality, high prices, and artificial
scarcity.' 7 Specifically, they questioned whether individuals should
have a right to carve out their own incremental innovations and protect
them through IPRs in light of the fact that innovation occurs
cumulatively. 18 Furthermore, they were concerned, as are many
contemporary scholars, that IPRs with lengthy term and scope might
give too much control to a single individual or corporation over some
vital aspect of culture and science, which may in turn affect the future of
innovation. 9 The overarching theme, however, was the promotion of
free trade and a corresponding opposition to monopolies. 20 Nineteenth
century documentation, such as Thomas Jefferson's letter to Isaac
McPherson and Lord Macaulay's speeches within the British Parliament,
oft-quoted within the digerati, reflect these general sentiments.2 '
In the contemporary context, the nineteenth century criticisms
relating to monopolies and the centralization of power stemming from
14. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 143-44 (2006) [hereinafter BENKLER,
WEALTH OF NETWORKS].
15. See, e.g., JARED SPARKS, THE LIFE OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN: CONTAINING THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY WITH NOTES AND A CONTINUATION (1845), at 156-57 (2008).
16. Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement, supra note 9, at 57; see also BOYLE, THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN, supra note 2, at 36-37.
17. See BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, supra note 2, at 36-37.
18. See, e.g., SPARKS, supra note 15, at 156-57.
19. BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, supra note 2, at 37.

20. See id.
21. See, e.g., Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement, supra note 9, at 53-57; LAWRENCE
LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 207 n.78

(2001) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), in 13 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 440, 442-43 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1956)). Note that criticism of IPRs was
certainly not confined to the United Kingdom or the United States during the nineteenth century.
The Congress of German Economists, for instance, resolved in 1863 that "patents hinder rather than
further the progress of invention." Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the
Nineteenth Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 4 n.8 (1950). Additionally, the Netherlands abolished its
patent system in 1869 as a corollary of the same criticisms. Boyle, The Second Enclosure
Movement, supra note 9, at 56-57. Indeed in the said countries various proposals were made to
replace patents, with state-provided prizes or bounties to particularly useful inventions being the
most popular.
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IPRs have manifested in the second enclosure movement critique.2 2 This
critique encompasses the theme that information, knowledge, and culture
have become increasingly privatized through the intellectual property
system so as to secure the economic returns demanded by the
manufacturers of the industrial information economy.23 Within the
academy, the second enclosure critique is exemplified by Lange's
thought-provoking examination of the public domain, Samuelson's
perceptive account of the application of copyright to computer programs
and digital materials, and Litman's work on digital copyright and the
public domain.24 Boyle has enriched this theoretical landscape through
his exploration of the basic romantic assumptions underlying intellectual
property constructs, his description of the second enclosure movement,
and, most importantly within the context of this paper, his visionary plea
to adopt an environmentalist framework so as to preserve the public
domain.
In diagnosing the harmful effects of the present enclosure
movement, scholars such as Boyle, Lessig, and Benkler have all turned
to empirical evidence, or the lack thereof, concerning the benefits and
detriments of IPRs.26 Traditionally, theorists have acknowledged both
economic and moral justifications for IPRs.27 That is, economically

22. See generally Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement, supra note 9; see also James
Boyle, Cruel, Mean, or Lavish?: Economic Analysis, Price Discriminationand DigitalIntellectual
Property, 53 VAND. L. REv. 2007, 2010 (2000); Peter Drahos, A Defence of the Intellectual
Commons, CONSUMER POL'Y REV., May 2006, at 2.
23. See, e.g., Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement, supranote 9; Peter K. Yu, Intellectual
Propertyand the Information Ecosystem, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1, 11-12 (2005).
24. David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1981);
Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerningthe Legal Protection of Computer Programs,94
COLUM. L. REv. 2308 (1994); JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT: PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ON THE NET (2001); see also Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965,
1010-11 (1990).
25. JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS (1996) [hereinafter BOYLE,
SHAMANS]; James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, 47
DUKE L.J. 87 (1997) [hereinafter Boyle, A Politics]; James Boyle, The Second Enclosure
Movement, supra note 9. Note that Lessig's perspective relating to the importance of free exchange
of ideas and information concerning creative endeavours, and his diagnoses of the destructive
effects of the present enclosure movement, are also significant within this context. LESSIG, supra
note 21, at 4-15. Benlder's work concerning the role of peer production in transforming markets
and freedom is also significant. BENKLER, WEALTH OF NETWORKS, supra note 14, at 62-63.
26. Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement, supra note 9, at 51; LESSIG, supra note 21, at
22; BENKLER, WEALTH OF NETWORKS, supranote 14, at 38.
27. See, e.g., SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF S. COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REvIEw OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 21 (Comm. Print 1958)

(Fritz Machlup); Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Casefor Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopiesand Computer Programs,84 HARv. L. REv. 281, 284 (1970).
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society is obliged to reward persons to the extent that they have
produced something useful in accordance with the dictum "as one sows,
so should one reap"; and morally, it is said that, at least within the
context of liberal philosophy, that a person has a natural right to the
product of her brain.28 With respect to patents, the theory states, if an
inventor cannot get a patent then she will have less incentive to invent
because others will be able to benefit from her invention without the cost
of creating it. 29 This is the classic provisioning problem that stems from
(so-called) free-riding. 30 As the theory goes, if people are allowed to
free-ride, there will be fewer inventors and, as a consequence, less
progress in "science and useful arts.'
While the theory of incentivization and IPRs is compelling, most of
the evidence that supports IPRs is indeed theoretical rather than
empirical in nature.32 It is true that, in theory at least, some types of
innovation patents are very likely to induce more innovation, particularly
where innovation is independent or noncumulative, which is to say that
one invention is essentially separate from another.3 3 Moreover, even
where innovation is cumulative, if the use of the patent is obvious then
the original patent holder will be compelled to license a patent to followon innovators.34 However, when the direction of an improvement to an
invention is ambiguous, then licensing may not occur and patents may in

28. SAM RICKETSON & MEGAN RICHARDSON, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CASES, MATERIALS
AND COMMENTARY 11 (2d ed. 1998).
29. LESSIG, supra note 21, at 205.
30. "So-called" because free-riding analysis sometimes ignores positive externalities,
spillovers or network effects. See, e.g., Samuelson et al., supra note 24, at 2375; Joseph Farrell,
Standardizationand Intellectual Property,30 JURIMETRICS J. 35, 36-38, 45-46 (1989) (discussing
network effects); LESSIG, supra note 21, at 205; Brett Frischmann & Mark Lemley, Spillovers, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 257, 281 (2007) ("Innovation is cumulative and is generally spurred by
decentralized competition. This is particularly likely to be true of an innovation subject to
productive reuse, since no one owner can capture the full value of that innovation anyway."); Brett
Frischmann, CulturalEnvironment and The Wealth of Networks, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1083, 1106-07
(2007) [hereinafter Frischmann, CulturalEnvironment].
31. LESSIG, supra note 21, at 205.
32. This was a problem related in Robert Hurt & Robert Schuchman, The Economic Rationale
for Copyright, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 421 (1966), quoted in BENEDICT ATKINSON, THE TRUE HISTORY
OF COPYRIGHT: THE AUSTRALIAN ExPERIENCE 1905-2005, at 9-10 (2007). See also Samuel Oddi,
The InternationalPatent System and Third World Development: Myth or Reality?, 63 DUKE L.J.
831, 837-42 (1987) (surmising that "[d]espite the 500-year history of the patent system, it is still
extremely difficult to ascertain whether a patent system actually results in a net social benefit to a
developed country").
33. LESSIG, supra note 21, at 205 n.65 (citing Adam Jaffe, The US. Patent System in
Transition: Policy Innovation and the Innovation Process 24-26 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 7280, 1999)).
34. LESSIG, supra note 2 1, at 205.
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fact impede innovation. 35 Hence, it can be reasoned that there are
situations where innovation will be assisted by the provision of patents
as well as situations where it will be harmed. 6 Semicommons theory,
espoused below, provides a theoretical foundation for this reasoning.
Within the incentivization context, Lerner's study concerning the
economics of innovation is thought-provoking.
He considered
amendments in intellectual property law in sixty countries over a time
frame of 150 years, examining nearly 200 intellectual property policy
changes.37 His study found that investment in research and development
decreases slightly when patent law is strengthened. 38 The inference is
that when a country strengthens its patent protection, it39 marginally
reduces the level of investment in innovation by local firms.
To be sure, empirical and theoretical scepticism concerning IPRs is
not new. It has existed since the early days of the patent system.40 Ben
Franklin pronounced patents immoral in his autobiographical account in
1793, and Mertonian norms (although subject to contestation) have
lingered in science since time immemorial. 41 Even within the
contemporary context, avid supporters of the IPR system have expressed

35. Id; see also THOMAS MANDEVILLE, UNDERSTANDING
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND THE PATENT SYSTEM 69-70 (1996).

NOVELTY:

INFORMATION,

36. Network externalities or spillovers provide one explicit example whereby IPRs may
indeed cause harm. See, e.g., Samuelson et al., supra note 24, at 2375; Farrell, supra note 30, at 3638, 45-46 (discussing network effects).
37. BENKLER, WEALTH OF NETWORKS, supra note 14, at 38-39 (citing Josh Lerner, Patent
Protectionand Innovation over 150 Years 30 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
8977, 2002)).
38.

BENKLER, WEALTH OF NETWORKS, supra note 14, at 38-39.

39. Id. The difficulty of proving the correlation between IPRs and Research & Development
is partly because of the difficulty of separating cause and effect. That is, IPRs may stimulate more
investment, but countries that invest more in R&D may demand more protection. See, e.g.,
AGRICULTURE AND THE WTO: CREATING A TRADING SYSTEM FOR DEVELOPMENT 254-56

(Merlinda lngco & John Nash eds., 2004). The experience of the United States and China
specifically in relation to agriculture is also thought-provoking. The Chinese are one of the most
advanced rice breeders in the world even though historically they have not had any form of
protection on new plant varieties. ROBERT DE LA PERRIERE & FRANCK SEURET, BRAVE NEW
SEEDS: THE THREAT OF TRANSGENIC CROPS TO FARMERS 94 (2000). On the other hand, in the
United States, protection led to an increase in improvement programmes for only two plant species.
The rare studies that have been conducted in countries where the protection of vegetal breeding has
existed for decades, like the United States, show that this type of legal system had several
consequences such as reduced information and genetic material exchange between the public sector
and the private sector, a low stimulus impact on plant improvement, an increase in the price of seeds
sold to farmers, and a diminished role of the public sector in plant improvement. See id. at 95.
40. LESSIG, supra note 21, at 206.
41.

Id (citing BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 215-16

(Frank W. Pine ed., 1916); LESSIG, supra note 21, at 206 (citing Robert K. Merton, A Note on
Science andDemocracy, I J. LEGAL & POL. SOC'Y 115, 123 (1942)).
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latent scepticism. Bill Gates, for instance, wrote the following memo to
Microsoft executives in 1991: "If people had understood how patents
would be granted when most of today's ideas were invented and had
taken out patents, the industry would be at a complete standstill today. 42
This empirical, theoretical, and pragmatic skepticism concerning
IPRs has become an important pillar of "cultural environmentalism"-a
notion coined by James Boyle in his seminal work
"A Politics of
3
Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?4
III. PART Two: CULTURAL ENVIRONMENTALISM

Cultural environmentalism is an emergent field of inquiry that,
inter alia, seeks to apply analytical frameworks of environmentalism to
IPR issues. 4 It has stemmed from Boyle's submission that those who
seek to protect the public domain and the intellectual commons are
working toward a similar end as environmentalists. 45 Like many sociopolitical movements and discourses, cultural environmentalism is
simultaneously reactive and proactive. It has "reacted" by exposing the
harms caused by a relentlessly maximalist program of IPR expansion (as
alluded to above).46 It has "proacted" through the creation and
maintenance of open source initiatives, creative commons projects, and
distributed creativity (as alluded to below).47
Attempting to define cultural environmentalism is fraught with
difficulty.
From a literal perspective, decoupling "culture" from
"environment" is a challenging task.48
Despite culture being a
fundamental theoretical sociological term, the 150 formal definitions
42. FRED WARSHOFSKY, THE PATENT WARS:
TECHNOLOGY 170 (1994).

THE BATTLE TO OWN THE WORLD'S

43. Boyle, A Politics,supra note 25, at 108-10.
44. Id.
45. Id. Although cultural environmentalism only entered the digerati lexicon in the past
decade, see Symposium, Cultural Environmentalism@ 10, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2007),
available at http://www.law.duke.edu/joumals/lcp/lcptoc70spring2007, the intellectual foundation
of cultural environmentalism draws upon a rich tapestry of historical thought and action: Jefferson,
Franklin, Madison, and Macaulay have all proved inspirational figures within the cultural
environment. BOYLE, PUBLIC DOMAIN, supra note 2 (providing a good overview of cultural
environmental inspirational figures). Moreover, the first copyright can be traced to the Duke of
Milan in 1481, and the Statute of Anne was enacted three centuries ago in 1709. RAY AUGUST ET
AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW: TExT, CASES AND READINGS 453 (5th ed. 2008).
46. See Boyle, A Politics,supra note 25, at 110.
47. See Robert A. Heverly, The Information Semicommons, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1127,
1143 (2003).
48. See David W. Opderbeck, DeconstructingJefferson's Candle: Toward a CriticalRealist
Approach to Cultural Environmentalism and Information Policy, 49 JURIMETRICS J. 203, 217
(2008).
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suggest a lack of consensus among sociologists. 49 Benkler's musings on
culture, however, are a useful starting point:
[Culture] is a frame of meaning from within which we must inevitably
function and speak to each other, and whose terms, constraints, and
affordances we always negotiate. There is no point outside of culture
from which to do otherwise. 50
As we all "speak to each other" within the context of an
"environment" of one sort or another, culture and the environment are
inextricably linked.5 ' The "environment" can be described as a system
of interconnected and/or interdependent resources that comprise the
"surrounding," "setting," or "context" that we inherit, live within, use,
interact with, change, and pass on to future generations. 52 Moving
beyond the literal, however, cultural environmentalism is much more
than the compilation of two distinct terms. Just as the natural physical
environment is inherited and passed on to future generations, so too the
cultural environment is inherited and passed on.53 The natural
environment and the cultural environment both evolve. 54 If the
metaphor is to be extended, there are numerous methods of constructing
55
and deconstructing the ecosystems of the cultural environment.
Frischmann, for example, suggests that the ecosystems of the cultural
environment can be distinguished using the parameters of broad
categories such as culture and science, via intellectual property such as
copyrights and patents or via the denomination of industry such as
computer, biotechnology, and medicine.56
49. Ilhyung Lee, Culturally-Based Copyright Systems?: The US. and Korea in Conflict, 79
WASH. U. L. Q. 1103, 1109 (2001); Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40
U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1151, 1165-67 (2007); Frischmann, Cultural Environment, supra note 30, at
1094 & n.39.
50. BENKLER, WEALTH OF NETWORKS, supra note 14, at 282.
51. Indeed Frischmann suggests that culture might be perceived as an environmental concept.
Frischmann, CulturalEnvironment, supra note 30, at 1094.
52. See Brett Frischmann et al., Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment 18
(Univ. of Pittsburgh Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2008-26, 2008)
(hereinafter Frischmann, ConstructingCommons].
53. See id.
54. In his book The Selfish Gene, Richard Dawkins argues that genes are not the only things
that replicate and evolve. RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 189-201 (2d ed. 1989). Culture
also evolves through the transfer of memes. Dawkins' meme, a unit of information, is a
measurement of convenience, a "pience" of information that can stand alone for an idea or cultural
phenomenon. According to Dawkins, "[e]xamples of memes are tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes
fashions, ways of making pots or of building arches." Id. at 192. Although Dawkins is referring to
genes, the concept is just as relevant to nature generally. Id.
55. See Frischmann, ConstructingCommons, supra note 52, at 18-19.
56. See Frischmann, CulturalEnvironment, supra note 30, at 1093.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol4/iss1/1

10

Cunningham: The Tragedy of (Ignoring) the Information Semicommons

2010]

THE TRAGEDY OF (IGNORING) THE INFORMATION SEMICOMMONS

Cultural environmentalism is perhaps best understood through
description rather than definition. At its core, it is concerned with
reconciling economics and information regulation in a manner that
promotes efficiency and justice. 7 It engages with this reconciliatory
process by concerning itself with the manner in which the public domain
and the commons can preserve the health and diversity of the
information ecology. As Boyle states:
Right now, it seems to me that, in a number of respects, we are at the
stage that the American environmental movement was at in the 1950s
or 1960s. At that time, there were people-supporters of the park
system, hunters, birdwatchers and so on-who cared about what we
would now identify as "environmental" issues. In the world of
intellectual property we now have start-up software engineers,
artists, parodists, biographers, biotech
libraries, appropriationist
8
researchers, and others.
As implied, the idea that "an environment" exists has allowed for
the establishment of a coalition around a reframed conception of
common interest.59 This reframed conception of the common interest
allows the duck-hunter and the bird-watcher to recognize their
commonality in the sense that they both rely on the functioning of the
wetlands and the accompanying ecosystem services. 60 Boyle explains:
The invention of the concept of "the environment" pulls together a
string of otherwise disconnected issues, offers analytical insight into
the blindness implicit in prior ways of thinking, and leads to perception
Like the
of common interest where none was seen before.
environment, the public domain must be "invented" before it is saved.
Like the environment, like "nature," the public domain turns out to be
a concept that is considerably more slippery than many of us realize.
domain nevertheless turns out to
And, like the environment, the public
61
be useful, perhaps even necessary.
Boyle's contention is that, whereas the environmental movement
illuminated the effects that social decisions can have upon ecology,
cultural environmentalists seek to illuminate the effects that intellectual
property laws can have upon culture and the information environment.62

57.
58.

BOYLE, SHAMANS, supranote 25, at x.
Boyle, A Politics,supranote 25, at 108.

59.
60.
61.
62.

See id.
Boyle, The Second EnclosureMovement, supra note 9, at 72-73.
Id. at 52.
See id.
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It is in this context that Boyle advocates for a set of analytical tools that
advance the importance of the public domain:
[A] successful political movement needs a set of (popularizable)
analytical tools which reveal common interests around which political
coalitions can be built. Just as "the environment" literally disappeared
as a concept in the analytical structure of private property claims,
simplistic "cause and effect" science, and markets characterized by
negative externalities, so too the "public domain" is disappearing, both
conceptually and literally, in an intellectual property system built
around the interests of the current stakeholders and the notion of the
original author. In one very real sense, the environmental movement
invented the environment so that farmers, consumers, hunters and
birdwatchers could all discover themselves as environmentalists.
Perhaps we need to invent the public
domain in order to call into being
63
the coalition that might protect it.
One of the first points of call concerning contemporary
environmentalism is "Silent Spring" published by Rachel Carson in
1962. 64 The work of Carson, coupled with the unwitting assistance of
Leopold and perhaps Pigou, led to some unique insights that
consequently shifted normative thought concerning societal governance
decisions. 65 What might be coined the Rachel Carson Paradigm declared
that, although humans naturally try to maximize their own accumulation
of benefits and ignore negative effects of their actions, a society that
wishes to survive and prosper must identify and take comprehensive
account of the real interacting consequences of individual decisions,
negative as well as positive, whether the marketplace accounts for them
or not. 66 Attempts to achieve such expanded accountings, as much as
63. Boyle, A Politics,supranote 25, at 113.
64. Of course, Silent Spring was a seminal work that made a significant contribution to a
contemporary movement. See RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962). However, to postulate that
the environmental movement has an explicit start date is to of course oversimplify history and
undermine the "standing on the shoulders of giants" affect so common in the realm of cultural
creation and production. Evidence of environmentalism, and the consequential placement value on
the oikos, is scattered throughout history. Contemporary environmentalists have drawn inspiration
from the collective wisdom of Indigenous Peoples, St Francis of Assi, Goethe (1749-1832), Thoreau
(1817-1862), Leopold (1887-1942) and Carson (1907-1964) to name but a few. Likewise, cultural
environmentalism also has its fair share of historical inspirational figures, albeit the time frame is
more condensed. Inspirational sources within cultural environmentalism, all of whom were
discussed above, include Jefferson, Madison, Macaulay, Stallman and Boyle.
65. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC, AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE (1949);
ARTHUR C. PiGou, WEALTH AND WELFARE (1912); see also Zygmunt J.B. Plater, From the

Beginning, a FundamentalShifi
of Paradigms:A Theory and Short History of EnvironmentalLaw,
27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 981,981-82 (1994).
66. Id.
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anything, have been the common strand connecting the wide range of
issues falling under the environmental law banner.67
Many of the justifications for environmental law and regulation
relate to the cultural environment, at least at the level of basic economic
analysis of market failures.68 Thus, in addition to being politically
attractive, at the outset cultural environmentalism has some theoretical
commonalities with environmentalism that are worth exploring. 69 As
Boyle states:
In both environmental protection and intellectual property, the very
structure of the decisionmaking process tends to produce a socially
undesirable outcome. Decisions in a democracy are made badly when
they are primarily made by and for the benefit of a few stakeholders,
be they landowners or content providers.7 °

Frischmann suggests that this reference to the decisionmaking
process speaks to the core problems of complexity and path dependence
in interlinked ecologies.7 1 Contemporary environmentalism gained
much of its persuasive power by pointing out that, for structural reasons,
we were likely to make bad environmental decisions: a legal system
based on a particular notion of what "private property" entailed and an
engineering or scientific system that treated the world as a simple,
linearly related set of causes and effects.7 2 In both of these conceptual
systems, the environment actually disappeared due to the fact that it
simply did not chronicle in the analysis. 73 It is therefore of no surprise
that the environment was not conserved.74 The same might be said in
relation to the public domain.75

67. Id.
68. Frischmann, CulturalEnvironment, supra note 30, at 1089.
69. Like environmentalism, cultural environmentalism is not a passing fad. It is true that
cultural environmentalism as a phrase only recently celebrated its tenth birthday by way of a
"Cultural Environmentalism @ 10" symposium hosted by Stanford Law's School Center for
Internet and Society, but the intellectual foundation of cultural environmentalism draws upon a rich
tapestry of historical thought. See Symposium, supra note 45. Of course intellectual property is not

a new concept. The first copyright can be traced to the Duke of Milan in 1461, and the Statute of
Anne was enacted in 1709. Hence, although the maximalist tendencies of IPRs did not begin in
earnest until the second half of the twentieth century, it would not be overly ambitious to suggest
that the heritage of cultural environmentalism is found in the passing of centuries rather than the
passing of decades.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Boyle, A Politics,supra note 25, at 110.
Frischmann, CulturalEnvironment, supranote 30, at 1090-91.
BOYLE, PUBLIC DOMAIN, supra note 2, at 241.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The invention of the "environment," however, has been no slight
Despite the rich
task for contemporary environmentalism. 76
philosophical history of environmentalist thought, contemporary
environmentalists have found it necessary to rely upon several distinct
analytical frameworks to advance environmental claims. 7 In no specific
order, the first exemplary analytical framework is that of the commons
and how it is used, regulated, and controlled.78 The second is public
choice theory, which speaks of the power of incumbents to shape law in
their favor.79 The third is welfare economics, which reveals the ways in
which markets can fail to take into account negative (and positive)
externalities associated with economic actors.80 The fourth exemplary
analytical framework is that of ecology, the comprehensive study
concerning the connection of the variable, fragile, and complex
interrelationships between living systems.8 '
This paper focuses specifically on the analytical framework of the
commons within the context of the cultural environment so as to develop
the theoretical foundation concerning the critical need to appreciate the
dynamic interaction between common uses and private uses within the
information environment.
IV. PART THREE: THE COMMONS AND RELATED TRAGEDIES
The nature of the commons has been a source of contention within
both environmentalism and cultural environmentalism. On the one
hand, environmentalism has struggled with the tragedy of the commons
with respect to nature: oceans, rivers, forests, and air.8 2 On the other
hand, cultural environmentalism has struggled with the tragedy of the
anticommons, particularly in relation to innovations such as computer

76.

Boyle, A Politics,supranote 25, at 110.

77. Id. at 108-09 (referring to two analytical frameworks--ecology and welfare economics).
While this is a useful starting point, this paper expands the set of environmental frameworks to
include "the commons" and "public choice theory." Forthcoming work will expand on "public
choice theory" and "welfare economics" within the IPR context.
78. See BOYLE, PUBLIC DOMAIN, supranote 2, at 45.
79. Tyler T. Ochoa, Copyright Duration: Theories and Practice, in 1 INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH 138 (Peter K. Yu ed. 2007).
80. BOYLE, PUBLIC DOMAIN, supra note 2, at 239.

81. Id. The term ecology or oekologie was coined by Ernst Haeckel, the German biologist, in
1866, and further developed by Eugenius Warming when he wrote the first textbook on the matter.
DAVID G. FRODIN, GUIDE TO STANDARD FLORAS OF THE WORLD 72 (2d ed. 2001). See also Boyle,
A Politics, supranote 25, at 108-09.
82. See generallyCARSON, supra note 64.
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software, agriculture, and medicine.8 3 To appreciate and juxtapose the
commons-related tragedies, the commons itself must be understood.
The Australian Oxford Pocket Dictionary defines the commons as
"for joint use, shared; land belonging to the community." 4 The shared
attributes of a common resource mean that the resource is free (libre) to
the community in the sense that the resource is subject to usage without
the permission of anyone else, or, if permission is granted, that it is done
so neutrally.8 5 A key attribute of the commons is that no single person
or organization has exclusive control over the use or disposition of a
particular resource. 86 Rather, resources governed by commons may be
used or disposed of by anyone (within a relevant community) in
accordance with rules that may range from "anything goes"
to quite
7
crisply articulated formal rules that are effectively enforced.
The most evident (regulated) commons in contemporary landscapes
are the footpaths, roads, and highways that facilitate our ability to move
from one place to the other.8 8 More subtle but just as important, without
which contemporary society could not function, is virtually all pretwentieth century knowledge and culture, a majority of scientific
knowledge from the first half of the twentieth century, and the lion's
share of contemporary science and academic learning.8 9 From the
commons perspective, Einstein's theory of relativity sits with the local
beach or park or the nearest footpath since the (relevant) community can
access these resources without the permission of anyone else. 90 As
Reichman puts it, common resources are protected by a liability rule
rather than a property rule. 9' It is not that no control exists, but rather

83.

See Part III.

84.

THE AUSTRALIAN OXFORD POCKET DICTIONARY (1976). See also LESSIG, supra note 21,

at 19-20; Frank Pasquale, Towardan Ecology of Intellectual Property:Lessonsfrom Environmental
Economics for Valuing Copyright's Commons, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH 78, 80-81 (2006); cf Carol
Rose, The Comedy of the Commons, in PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY,

THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 105, 106 (1994) (noting that U.S. legal doctrine has
strongly suggested that some kinds of properties should not be held exclusively in private hands but
instead should be open to the public or at least subject to public right of use).
85. LESSIG, supra note 21, at 19-20 & n.3.
86. Id at 20.
87. Yochai Benkler, The Political Economy of the Commons, UPGRADE, June 2003, at 6
[hereinafter Benkler, The Political Economy], available at http://www.benlder.orgfUpgradeNovatica%20Commons.pdf.
88. BENKLER, WEALTH OF NETWORKS, supra note 14, at 61-62.
89. Benkler, The PoliticalEconomy, supranote 87, at 7.
90. Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement, supranote 9, at 62-63.
91. Jerome Reichman & Tracy Lewis, Using Liability Rules to Stimulate Local Innovation in
Developing Countries: Application to TraditionalKnowledge, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS
AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME (Keith
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the type of control is different from the control granted by property
law.92

It is doubtful that the commons can be described as obscure, as
Lessig claims in "The Future of Ideas," but neither is the term
exceptionally fashionable, as claimed by Gorman, who argues that the
rhetoric of information commons diverts attention from the enduring
value of libraries.93 Both Lessig and Benkler employ the commons
notion for normative and practical purposes, to promote freedom and
individual liberty in seeking to halt the march of IPR maximalism, and94
to harvest the creative and economic bounty of social production.
Questioning the presumptive link between commons and scarcity is an
important dimension of this discourse, particularly as such discourse
relates to the information ecology.
A.

Information Ecology

Just as one speaks of ecology as it relates to natural physical
systems, the notion of information ecology is also palatable. 9 An
important dimension of information ecology is an appreciation of the
role of rivalry and exclusion, particularly within commons discourse.96
This is because rivalry and exclusion represent the axes of parameters
and opportunities within the information commons. In this sense, both
rivalry and exclusion are matters of degree, and together they provide
insights into the ecology of information. 97

E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005). For an interesting discussion of the "liability rule"
and its application to the contemporary commons, see Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement,
supranote 9, at 68 & n. 145.
92. See Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Innovation, 51 DUKE L.J. 1783, 1788 (2002).
93. LESSIG, supra note 21, at 19; Ian McShane, Sustaining the Local Commons, the CCI
International Conference: Creating Value: Between Commerce and Commons 3 (June 25, 2008)
(citing MICHAEL GORMAN, THE ENDURING LIBRARY: TECHNOLOGY, TRADITION AND THE QUEST
FOR BALANCE (2003)).
94. McShane, supra note 93, at 3.
95. See, e.g., Symposium, The Conference on Intellectual Property,SustainableDevelopment,
and EndangeredSpecies: Understandingthe Dynamics of the Information Ecosystem, 2005 MICH.
ST. L. REv. 1 (2005).
96. Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructureand Commons Management,
89 MINN. L. REv. 917, 942 (2005) [hereinafter Frischmann, An Economic Theory].
97. Id. at 942 n.93; RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES,
PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 8-10 (2d ed. 1996); Shubha Ghosh, Deprivatizing Copyright,54
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 387, 402-06 (2003); OSTROM, supra note 8, at 8-15; cf Charlotte Hess &
Elinor Ostrom, Ideas, Artifacts and Facilities:Information as a Common-Pool Resource, 66 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 118-21 (2003) (suggesting that scholars sometimes conflate resource
For useful tables concerning rivalrousness of
classification with property right issues).
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1. Rivalry and Exclusion
In theory, any resource may be held in common, but pragmatically
the question a society is confronted with is which resources should be,
and for those resources, how.98 If a resource is nonrivalrous, then the
challenge relates to provision rather than depletion in the sense that the
difficulty lies in providing enough incentive to produce the resource (i.e.
provisioning problem) rather than ensuring that the resource is not
overburdened by demand (i.e. depletion problem). 99 A rivalrous
resource presents more challenges than nonrivalrous resources because
when the resource is rivalrous the issues of provisions and depletion are
simultaneously relevant.'°°
Both the depletion and provisioning problems give rise to an
excludability requirement. Despite the dichotomy between pure public
goods and pure private goods, the public or private nature of a resource
is not necessarily a direct function of excludability (see Table 1
below). 01 Even within what might be loosely referred to as "the
commons," the parameter of exclusion differs intensely. 0 2 Open
commons, for instance, can be distinguished from limited-access
commons." 3 Examples of open commons include the oceans, the air
and highway systems, whereas limited-access commons are exemplified
by irrigation regions in Spain or Swiss villages, where access is limited
only to members of the village or association that collectively "owns"
some defined irrigation system or pastureland.1°4 As Carol Rose notes,
these later examples are better labeled as limited common property
regimes, rather than commons, because they behave as property vis-A-vis
the entire world except members of the group who together hold them in
common. 0 5 The following table exemplifies various classifications of
resources based on rivalry and exclusion.
consumption, see Frischmann, An Economic Theory, supra note 96, and Hess & Ostrom, supra, at
120.
98. LESSIG, supra note 21, at 11-12.
99. Frischmann, An Economic Theory, supra note 96, at 946.47; LESSIG, supra note 21, at 21.
100. This in turn gives rise to a welfare economic consideration in the sense that consumption
by some agents may occur at the expense of other agents who do not obtain the opportunity to
consume. See, e.g., LESSIG, supranote 21, at 21.
101. CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 97, at 39; cf. Harold Demsetz, Towards a Theory of
Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 347, 348 (1967). See also Frischmann, An Economic Theory,
supranote 96, at 942-56, 963-64.

102. See OSTROM, supranote 8, at 23.
103. Id.
104.

BENKLER, WEALTH OF NETWORKS, supra note 14, at 61 (citing OSTROM, supranote 8).

105. Benkler, The Political Economy, supra note 87, at 6-7; BENKLER, WEALTH OF
NETWORKS, supra note 14, at 61-62.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2010

17

Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 4 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 1

AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL

Table 1: A Classification of Goods Based
on Concepts of Rivalry
10 6
and Exclusion

Nonrival

o

Congestible

o

Hyperexclusive
Public Good (e.g.
snow ski field)

Non-pure Public
Good (e.g. Rottnest
Island)

centre)

Rival
9(e.g.
1

EXCLUDABILITY
Nonexclusive
Exclusive
Pure Public Good Roll or Club
Goods (e.g.
(e.g. idea, fact,
language, air,
country club)
oceans)
Non-pure
Non-pure Public
Public Good
Good (e.g. road,
beach or national
(e.g. golf club
park)
or day care
Limited
Commons
Property Regimes
irrigation
systems, libraries,
lakes, rivers,
forests, grazing

Pure Private
Good (e.g.
apple)

Pure Private Good
(e.g. Rolls Royce)

areas, Internet)

2. Information Goods
The unique attributes of information mean that rivalry and
exclusion especially come to the fore in relation to information goods.
As Stiglitz and Grossman remind us, the economic analysis of
information is riddled with internal paradox: Information is both a
component of the perfect market and a good that must be produced
within that market. 10 7 In the context of the former, information access
106. Frischmann, An Economic Theory, supra note 96, at 942-43; Hess & Ostrom, supra note
97, at 120.
107. Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally
Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REv. 393, 405 (1980); Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and
the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY:
ECONOMIC AND SOcIAL FACTORS 618 (1962) (arguing that without IPRs too little information will
be produced because producers of information will not be able to capture its true value); Eugene F.
Fama & Arthur B. Laffer, Information and CapitalMarkets, 44 J. Bus. 289, 295-97 (1971) (arguing
that without property rights or some other way of protecting against public goods problems, too
much information will be generated because some information will be produced solely to gain a
temporary advantage in trading, thus redistributing wealth but not achieving greater allocative
efficiency); Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to
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and provision has long been a critical component of the perfect
market. 10 8 As to the latter, information is to be commodified so as to
overcome the provisioning problem discussed above. Herein lies the
contradiction.
Each property right that is granted to ensure the
production of information is a transaction cost when seen from the
perspective of market efficiency.'0 9 In this sense, "[t]here is a
fundamental conflict between the efficiency with which markets spread
information and the incentives to acquire information.""
This
fundamental conflict has often been subject to an illusory reconciliation
process whereby problems are classified as either incentive- or
efficiency-based problems."' A corollary of this illusory reconciliation
is that many of the provisioning problems have become overstated,
while the efficiency costs and other losses generated by the granted
rights have generally been understated.12
The efficiency costs are encompassed within the second enclosure
critique (discussed above) as a consequence of the artificial exclusion
established by the legal protection of LPRs. The risk associated here is
that the artificial exclusion established by the legal protection of IPRs is
too strong, amounting to a "tragedy of the anticommons.' ' 1 3 With
regard to the depletion problem, the unique nature of information means
that there is no need to allocate its use since there is no danger of a
"tragedy of the commons" as the information commons simply cannot
be overgrazed.
IPRs are not only unnecessary to preserve the
information commons, but may in fact amount to an artificial barrier to

Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REv. 561, 570-72 (1971) (arguing that patent law may be either a

necessary incentive for the production of inventions or an unnecessarily legal monopoly in
information that overcompensates an inventor who has already had the opportunity to trade on the
information implied by her discovery).
108. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776) (espousing generally five principles of

liberal economics (1) pursuit of self-interest (2) the division labor (3) free trade (4) free and
accessible access to information (5) avoidance of large monopolistic players). For a contemporary
perspective, see Alex McDonald, The Body Shop: The Triple Bottom Line, 94 CANBERRA BULL.
PUB. ADMIN. 43,44 (1999).
109. Boyle, A Politics, supra note 25, at 96 n.21 (citing BOYLE, SHAMANS, supra note 25, at
35-42). See also Grossman & Stiglitz, supra note 107, at 393-408; BOYLE, PUBLIC DOMAIN, supra

note 2, at 40.
110.
405).
Ill.
112.

Boyle, A Politics, supra note 25, at 96 (citing Grossman & Stiglitz, supra note 107, at
See, e.g., Boyle, A Politics, supranote 25, at 96-97.
Boyle, A Politics, supra note 25, at 97 n.23 (citing BOYLE, SHAMANS, supra note 25, at

35-36).
113. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698 (1998).
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the information commons generally.'1 4 It is within this context that it
proves useful to juxtapose the tragedy of the commons with the tragedy
of the anticommons.
B.

The Tragedy of the Commons

The original tragedy of the commons espoused by Hardin arises
when too many people have a privilege to use a resource and no one user
has a legal right to exclude any other user with the end result being over
consumption and the depletion of the resource. 15 Hardin used the
notion of a "pasture open to all" so as to make the point that each
herdsman has an incentive to add more cattle than the pasture as a whole
can bear since the costs of the cattle are socialized and the benefits of the
cattle are privatized in favor of the herdsman. 16 Hence, under this
tragedy each herder is motivated to add more and more animals because
she receives the direct benefit of her own animals and bears only a share
of the costs resulting from overgrazing. As Hardin describes the
consequences:
Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels
him to increase his herd without limit-in a world that is limited. Ruin
is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursing his own best
interest in a society that believes in the17 freedom of the commons.
Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.'
Of course Hardin was not the first to become aware of the tragedy
of the commons. Aristotle long ago observed that: property that is
common to many has the least care conferred upon it.11 8 The state of
nature as described by Hobbes is yet another variation of this theme:
People seek their own good and end up killing one another.'1 9 In the
nineteenth century, Lloyd outlined a theory of the commons that foresaw
careless use for property owned in common; 20 contemporary

114. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75
TEx. L. REv. 989, 996-98 (1997).
115. See generally Garrett Hardin, Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968).
116. LESSIG, supra note 21, at 22.
117. Hardin, supranote 115, at 1244. See also LESSIG, supra note 21, at 22.
118. OSTROM, supra note 8, at 2 (citing ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, bk. II, ch. 3 (Trevor J. Saunders
trans., Clarendon Press 1996)).
119. See HELEN THORNTON, STATE OF NATURE OR EDEN?: THOMAS HOBBES AND HIS
CONTEMPORARIES ON THE NATURAL CONDITION OF HUMAN BEINGS 1 (2005). See also OSTROM,
supra note 8, at 2-3.
120. William F. Lloyd, On the Checks to Population,in MANAGING THE COMMONS (Garrett
Hardin & John Baden eds., 1977).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol4/iss1/1

20

Cunningham: The Tragedy of (Ignoring) the Information Semicommons

2010]

THE TRAGEDY OF (IGNORING) THE INFORMATION SEMICOMMONS

scholarship concerning resource economics also postulates that where a
number of users have access to a common-pool resource, the cumulated
resource units withdrawn from the 1resource
will be more than the
21
withdrawal.
of
level
economic
optimal
One of the great ironies of the tragedy of the commons discourse is
that Hardin's thesis originally aimed to explain why private incentives
would lead firms to pollute their environment even against their own
long-term interest, and thereby to justify pollution controls. 22 The
tragedy of the commons thesis has since taken on a life of its own
coming to stand for the proposition that all commons are tragic and that
property rights are a necessary 23precondition to efficient, or even
sustainable, resource management.1
It is true that there is a diverse range of instances where the tragedy
of the commons has eventuated. Examples include various famines,
firewood provision crises, and climate change. 124 Nevertheless, it is
equally true that not all commons situations have fallen into the trap of
the commons dilemma. 12 5 Ostrom hypothesizes that the difference

121. COLIN W. CLARK, MATHEMATICAL BIOECONOMICS: THE OPTIMAL MANAGEMENT OF
RENEWABLE RESOURCES 27 (1976); Colin W. Clark, Restricted Access to Common-Property
Fishery Resources: A Game-Theoretic Analysis, in DYNAMIC OPTIMIZATION AND MATHEMATICAL
ECONOMICS (Pain-Tai Liu ed., 1980); PARTHA S. DASGUPTA & GEOFFREY M. HEAL, ECONOMIC
THEORY AND EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCES 74-75 (1979).
122. Benkler, The PoliticalEconomy, supranote 87, at 7.
123. Robert J. Smith, Resolving the Tragedy of the Commons by CreatingPrivate Property
Rights in Wildlife, 1 CATO J. 439, 467-68 (1981).
124. OSTROM, supra note 8, at 3. See also Anthony C. Picardi & William W. Seifert, A
Tragedy of the Commons in the Sahel, 43 EKISTICS 297-304 (1977) (discussing sahelian famine);
Colin Norman, No Panaceafor the Firewood Crisis, 226 SC. 676 (1984) (discussing firewood
crisis); James T. Thomson, Ecological Deterioration:Local-Level Rule Making and Enforcement
Problems in Niger, in DESERTIFICATION: ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION IN AND AROUND ARID
LANDS 57-79 (Michael H. Glantz ed., 1977); Rick K. Wilson, Constraints on Social Dilemmas: An
Institutional Approach, 2 ANNALS OF OPERATIONS RES. 183 (1985) (discussing acid rain); Kari
Bullock & John Baden, Communes and the Logic of the Commons, in MANAGING THE COMMONS
182-99 (Garrett Hardin & John Baden eds., 1977) (discussing Mormon Church); Kenneth A.
Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Legislative Politics and Budget Outcomes, in FEDERAL BUDGET
POLICY IN THE 1980S, at 343-67 (Gregory B. Mills & John L. Palmer eds., 1984) (discussing United
States Congress overspending); Philip A. Neher, The Pure Theory of the Muggery, 68 AM. ECON.
REV. 437-45 (1978) (discussing urban crime); Duncan Snidal, Coordination Versus Prisoner's
Dilemma: Implicationsfor InternationalCooperationand Regimes, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 923-42
(1985) (discussing public-sector/private sector relationships); Malvem Lumsden, The Cyprus
Conflict as a Prisoner's Dilemma, 17 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 7-32 (1973) (discussing the Cyprus
conflict).
125. See MAKING THE COMMONS WORK: THEORY, PRACTICE AND POLICY 63-267 (Daniel
Bromley & David Feeney eds., 1992) (discussing a number of case studies). See also OSTROM,
supra note 8, at 58-102; ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 167 (1991).
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between those who fall victim to the commons dilemma trap and those
who do not may relate to factors internal to a given group. 12 6 The
participants may not have the ability to communicate with each other (as
per the prisoner's dilemma), no means to foster trust, and no sense that
they are to share a common future. 127 Moreover, even where a commons
dilemma has become entrenched, the predicament may be rectified
assistance measures such as the provision of a
through strategic external
28
government subsidy.1
Although the commons dilemma is not fait accompli, the notion
that "the whole world is best managed when divided among private
owners" has principally dominated public debate over the last three
decades and, as a corollary, the prevailing tendencies have been to
divide as many resources as possible among private owners so as to
better manage the world. 129 Indeed, the coupling of the tragedy of the
commons arguments with the Demsetzian notion that such "tragic"
situations gives rise to solutions grounded in exclusionary property right
regimes has provided a powerful springboard to support the neoliberal
privatization propensity. 30 The Demsetzian conception is symbolized
by the work of Smith who pronounced the following "privatize or
perish" perspective with respect to environmental conservation in 1981:
Both the economic analysis of common property resources and
Hardin's treatment of the tragedy of the commons [means that] the
only way to avoid the tragedy of the commons in natural resources and
wildlife is to end the common-property system by creating a system of
private property rights. 131

126. OSTROM, supranote 8, at 21.
127. Id. For an excellent overview of scholarship that discusses circumstances under which
common property regimes are more efficient than individual property regimes, see Hess & Ostrom,
supra note 97, at 118-21, suggesting that scholars sometimes conflate resource classification with
property right issues.
128. OSTROM, supra note 8, at 21. This description of strategic behavior exemplifies the
public choice theory scenario, which will be discussed in future research.
129. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property,53 U. CHI. L. REv. 711, 712 (1986). It is possible that the Global Financial Crisis that has
eventuated throughout 2007-2009 will tame the privatization tendencies that gained currency since
the 1980s. For a colloquial and distinctly Australian exposition of this submission, see Kevin Rudd,
The Global FinancialCrisis,THE MONTHLY, Feb. 2009, at 20-29.
130. See Demsetz, supra note 101, at 347.
131. Smith, supra note 123, at 467. See generally id. See also W. P. Welch, The Political
Feasibilityof Full Ownership PropertyRights: The Cases of Pollutionand Fisheries, 16 POL'Y SCI.
165 (1983). "[T]he establishment of full property rights is necessary to avoid the inefficiency of
overgrazing." Id. at 171.
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This privatisation paradigm has dominated even though "our legal
doctrine has strongly suggested that some kinds of property should not
be held exclusively in private hands, but should be open to the
public.' 3 2 Rose has pointed to this tension by implicating that the
traditional rules concerning public acquisition of streets and roads does
not sit comfortably with the private property assumptions of classical
economic theory:
Indeed, public acquisition of roadways by long usage seems a
particularly striking illustration of the imperviousness of practice to
theory: the doctrines by which the public acquired roads over private
property, without purchase even through eminent domain, flourished
and
side by side with the popularization of classical economics
33
burgeoning of privately owned commerce and industry.
In the context of property-based ironies and the privatization
predilection generally, Rose advances an argument-adopted by Lessig
and Benkler-that the underutilization of resources might be as tragic as
their exhaustion. 34 This, of course, is the tragedy of the anticommons.
By contrast with the tragedy of the commons, the tragedy of the
anticommons points to the quandary of where "too many owners hold
rights of exclusion, the resource is prone to under use."' 3 5 The
is, in many ways, the mirror image of the
anticommons tragedy
36
1
tragedy.
commons
C.

The Tragedy of the Anticommons

Anticommons property exists where multiple owners have a right to
exclude others from a scarce resource, and no one has an effective
privilege of use. 3 7 As others had already theorized that anticommons
property might exist in theory, Heller's contributions were more
nuanced. 38 Firstly, to demonstrate how a limited number of exclusory

132. Rose, supra note 129, at 711-13.
133. Id. at 723. See also Harry N. Scheiber, Public Rights and the Rule of Law in American
Legal History, 72 CAL. L. REv. 217, 221-27, 233-49 (1984).
134. See generally Rose, supra note 129.
135. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transitionfrom
Marx to Markets, 11 HARV. L. REv. 621, 624 (1998) [hereinafter Heller, The Tragedy].
136. Michael A. Heller, Three Faces of Private Property, 79 OR. L. REv. 417, 423 (2000)
(hereinafter Heller, Three Faces].
137. Id. at 423-24; Heller, The Tragedy, supranote 135, at 624-26.
138. Hunter, supra note 5, at 509-11.
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rights would suffice to generate anticommons property, and secondly, to
provide actual physical-world examples of anticommons property. 3 9
An important differentiator between Hardin's tragedy of the
commons and Heller's tragedy of the anticommons is the "right to
exclude."' 40 As Aoki explains, in the commons tragedy, part of the
problem is that no one has the right to exclude, thereby giving rise to
over-utilization and depletion.' 4' By contrast, under the anticommons
tragedy, too many parties independently possess the right to exclude,
which gives rise to under-utilization amounting to the "tragedy of the
anticommons.' 4 2 As the commons is defined as "for joint use, shared;
land belonging to the community,' 143 most theorists assumed that the
anticommons could only come into existence if every member had the
right to exclude. 144 Since "member" in this context meant any person,
the requirement was thought to mean that an anticommons would only
occur if every single individual could prevent other uses. 145 As a
consequence, practically speaking, the anticommons under these
preconditions would be virtually impossible. Given such difficult
prerequisites, theorists were simply unable to conceptualize a physicalworld equivalent, and hence did not progress the argument. 146
Heller's insight concerning how a limited number of exclusory
rights would suffice to generate anticommons property was used to
demonstrate that a small number of individuals could effectively
frustrate a more efficient use by others. 147 The classic example used by
Heller to exemplify this phenomenon is that of the post-1989 Moscow
storefronts that remained empty while at the same time flimsy metal
kiosks promulgated. 148 Kiosk vendors were required to sell goods in the
cold, rather than using the empty shops behind them, as a direct
consequence of the complex bundle of property rights that had been

139. Heller, The Tragedy, supra note 135, at 627-60; see also Hunter, supranote 5, at 509-11.
140. Keith Aoki, Neo-Colonialism, Anticommons Property and Biopiracy in the (Not-SoBrave) New World Order of International Intellectual Property Protection, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 11, 29-30 (1998).

141. Id.
142. Heller, The Tragedy, supra note 135, at 622.
143.

THE AUSTRALIAN OXFORD POCKET DICTIONARY (1976).

144. Hunter, supranote 5, at 509-11.
145. Id.
146. Id.at 509-11 n.490 (citing Frank Michelman, Ethics, Economics and the Law of Property,
24 NoMos 3, 5-6 (1982)).
147. Hunter, supra note 5, at 509-11 (citing Heller, Three Faces, supra note 136); Heller, The
Tragedy, supra note 135, at 621-26, 659; Heller, Three Faces,supranote 136, at 424.
148. Heller, The Tragedy, supra note 135, at 623-24, 628-33.
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149
established in the transition from a socialist to a market economy.
The convoluted set of divided and coordinated entitlements meant that
someone could always inhibit the efficient usage of the relevant

property. 150 As Heller notes:

Once anticommons property is created, markets or governments may
have difficulty in assembling rights into usable bundles. After initial
entitlements are set, institutions and interests coalesce around them,
with the result that the path to private
property may be blocked and
51
scarce resources may be wasted.1
Heller argues that in the digital information era the anticommons
poses a more serious threat than the post-1989 Moscow shopfronts
because the digital brand of anticommons simultaneously averts better
52
uses of the resource and conceals the recognition that better uses exist.1
That is, while the empty Moscow shopfronts advertise the existence of
the anticommons, in the digital information anticommons the new
product that might have been generated through the novel use of gene
fragments, for instance, is never realized. 5 3
One might theorize that if Adam Smith's perfect information were
to exist, and if Coase's transaction costs were to disappear, and if all
economic actors were perfectly rational and if economic actors did not
engage in strategic behavior, then it may be possible to simply
reassemble the various property entitlements into efficiently usable
bundles. However, as one of Diderot's famous characters exclaimed
when confronted by his masters relentless if questions: "If, if, if ...if
the sea boiled, there would be a lot of cooked fish!' 5 4 In the physical
world with less than perfect information, real transaction costs, irrational
economic actors and active strategic behavior, the anticommons is
difficult, if not completely impossible, to rebundle.' 5 5 It is at this
juncture that the utility of semicommons theory becomes apparent,
particularly as it underlines the nature of strategic behavior while

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

See id.
See id. at 659.
Id.
Hunter, supra note 5, at 511-12.
Heller, Three Faces, supra note 136, at 424-25; Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 113, at

700-01.
154. MURRAY BOOKCHIN, PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL ECOLOGY: ESSAYS IN DIALECTICAL
NATURALISM 39 (1990).
155. See Heller, The Tragedy, supra note 135, at 625-26; Heller, Three Faces, supra note 136,

at 424 ("Once an anticommons emerges, collecting rights into usable private property may prove to
be brutal and slow.").
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simultaneously fostering an appreciation for the dynamic interaction
between private and commons uses of information.
D. The Tragedy of (Ignoring)the Information Semicommons
As implied above, information is significantly different from most
tangible commodities because of its nonrival and nonexclusive traits.' 56
Given this, the legal structures and policy discourse that surround
information should also be different.'1 7 As information has become a
critical raw material for production in the digital information age,
questions concerning the ownership of information have dramatically
increased in importance.
Two global viewpoints are generally identifiable concerning
information ownership. The first concentrates on private ownership (and
thus private control) of information in frameworks drawn primarily from
property theory. 58 The second viewpoint gives attention to common
ownership (and thus common control) of information. 59 For the most
part, the two viewpoints are presented as a contra-distinction, where
60
private use exists at the expense of common use and vice-versa.'
Themes related to individual autonomy, efficiency, and justice are all
6
employed by opposing theorists to support entrenched positions.' '
Private use proponents advocate more private control, longer ownership
to information, whereas commons
terms, and more rights in relation
62
proponents argue the opposite.
The IPR debates primarily stem from the understanding that
common and private uses of information are intrinsically at odds.1 63 For
instance, granting longer copyright protection for information is seen as
having the effect of removing that information from the information

156.

BOYLE, PUBLIC DOMAIN, supranote 2, at 264.

157. See LESSIG, supra note 21, at 19-23; MICHAEL PERELMAN, STEAL THIS IDEA:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CORPORATE CONFISCATION OF CREATIVITY 196
(2004); MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 8 (1993); Heverly,
supra note 47, at 1130-41.

158. Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Are Ideas Within the Traditional Definition of Property?:A
JurisprudentialAnalysis, 47 ARK. L. REV. 603, 604 (1994) (concluding that common law idea
protection, trade secret law, and patent law are all property based regimes predicated on the
recognition of property rights in ideas).
159. Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures ofRegulation
TowardSustainable Commons and UserAccess, 52 FED. CoMM. L.J. 561, 562-63 (2000).
160. Heverly, supra note 47, at 1143.
161. Id
162. Id.
163.

Id.
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commons. 64 Accordingly, copyright protection and the information
commons remain mostly mutually exclusive. 6 5 A critical thread within
this debate, as evidenced by the second enclosure movement critique, is
that private property displaced the commons so as to make more
efficient use of the resource in question. 66 Indeed, this thread has
become so entrenched within contemporary [PR discourse that some IPR
to recast IPR discussion away from the
minimalists have pleaded
67
metaphor.1
property
Interestingly, despite this plea, Heverly postulates that there is
perhaps scope to further develop the property metaphor within the
information environment. 68 He employs this argument, not to add
weight to the maximalist IPR arguments, but rather to shift the focus
away from the public/private dichotomy of information ownership and
interaction between private and common uses of
on to the dynamic
69
information.
1. The Semicommons
Heverly's arguments are built upon the insights of Smith, Rose, and
others that all types of property contain rudiments of private and
common ownership, albeit often one or the other dominates. 70 As
Smith explains, a person possesses quasi-private rights to that moving
spot on the highway that her vehicle occupies when driving, yet a
highway is accepted as a "commons" because that is its more significant
feature.' 7 1 Likewise, a parcel of land that is subject to an easement for
emergency services is generally thought of as "private."'l7 2 It is this
164. Id.
165. Contemporary initiatives such as Free (Libre) and Open Source Software and the Creative
Commons provide the rationale to move the debate away from the historically based "private use
versus common use" dichotomy.
166. Hardin, supra note 115, at 1243-48; Heverly, supra note 47, at 1144. For alternative
viewpoints, see Robert C. Allen, The Efficiency and DistributionalConsequences of Eighteenth
Century Enclosures, 92 ECON. J. 937, 950-51 (1982) and ROBERT C. ALLEN, ENCLOSURE AND THE
YEOMAN 2-3 (1992), and compare Michael Turner, English Open Fields and Enclosures:
Retardationor ProductivityImprovements, 46 J. ECON. HIST. 669, 687-88 (1986).
167. Hunter, supra note 5, at 458-503 (arguing that the "place" metaphor used in discussing
and referring to the Internet has colored our perceptions and led us to accept property based
conceptions of information, and raising important issues as to the way in which metaphors affect
law).
168. See Heverly, supranote 47, at 1146-47.
169. Id.
170. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights, supra note 8, at 131-32; Rose, supra note 84, at
105; see also OSTROM, supra note 8.
171. Smith, Semicommon PropertyRights, supra note 8, at 131-32.
172. Id.
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dynamic interaction between private and common uses of resources that
lies at the heart of semicommons theory. Within a semicommons,
property is owned and used in common for one chief purpose; however,
in relation to some other key purpose, private interests obtain property
rights to separate pieces of the commons. Smith exemplifies the
semicommons thus:
The archetypal example of a semicommons is the open-field system of
medieval and early modem northern Europe. In the open-field system,
peasants had private property rights to the grain they grew on their
individual strips of under 1 acre, which were scattered in two or three
large fields around the central village. However, during certain
seasons, peasants would be obligated to throw the land open to all the
landowners for grazing their animals (especially sheep) in common,
under a common herdsman. This enabled them to take advantage of
economies of scale in grazing and private incentives in grain growing
(with no important scale economies).' 73
Traditionally under the open-field system, a peasant grain grower
engaged in strategic behavior by influencing, coercing or bribing the
shepherd to graze the flock on other private users' plots during the day
(so as to avoid the detrimental impact on the soil from grazing), and to
pen up the flock on his property at night (so as to capture the benefit of
fertilization from sheep droppings). 74 To avoid this strategic behavior,
a private owner's lands were scattered throughout the designated area of
the whole grazing land.' 75 The rationale of this approach was to increase
the cost of engaging in strategic behavior in that it made it very difficult,
if not impossible, for the grazing shepherd to work out whose land the
flock was either grazing upon in the day or enclosed in for the
evening. 176 As the scattering created property demarcation challenges
for the shepherd, agreement between the shepherd and the private user
concerning strategic grazing or enclosure of the flock involved
considerable transactions costs. 177 As a corollary, scattering had the
effect of minimizing strategic behavior while at the same time capturing

173.
174.
175.
176.

Smith, Semicommon PropertyRights, supra note 8, at 132.
Heverly, supra note 47, at 1172.
Smith, Semicommon PropertyRights, supra note 8, at 132.
Heverly, supranote 47, at 1164.

177. Note that the transaction costs in this context were represented by the time and effort for
the shepherd and the private user to enact an agreement relating to the strategic grazing or enclosure
of the flock. For further discussion, see Heverly, supra note 47, at 1164.
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that flowed from using the land for both private
the dynamic benefits
17
and common uses.

8

Although scattering may appear prima facie inefficient due to
peasant farmers being required to farm in varied locations, this apparent
inefficiency was in fact a source of efficiency when the costs of strategic
behavior were taken into account. 179 As Smith explains, scattering of
private plots, and thus private uses, was part of the overall design used to
prevent strategic behavior, and in this sense it was an economically
efficient, and indeed rational, method of property ownership.180 This is
particularly the case in that semicommons property ownership
maximized wealth to an extent not possible under either a purely
common or a purely private ownership scheme.
2. The Information Semicommons
In adapting semicommons theory to the information environment,
Heverly employs the "fair use" copyright doctrine so as to draw
attention to the interaction of private and common uses of
information.18 1 The example of a standard book review within the
information environment demonstrates the benefits of an information
semicommons property scheme. 182 Heverly submits that a book
reviewer often relies upon fair use provisions within the IPR regime to
quote a book author's words for the purposes of critiquing and reviewing
the book. 183 This is a classic example of an information semicommons
as clearly private and common uses are interacting. This interaction is
dynamic in the sense that private use affects commons use and vice
versa.' 4 The benefit lies in the exposure to the public that the author

178.

Smith, Semicommon Property Rights, supra note 8, at 132-39.

179. Note that there were no economies of scale for farming during this time period, but there
were economies of scale to herding. Smith, Semicomnon PropertyRights, supra note 8, at 135-36;
Heverly, supra note 47, at 1165.
180. Smith, Semicommon PropertyRights, supra note 8, at 132-34.
181. See, e.g., Heverly, supra note 47, at 1130 (explaining that information is viewed as private

property, and exceptions such as fair use are viewed as tolerable infringements on the rights of
private property owners).
182. In relation to the costs of prohibiting strategic behavior within the information
semicommons, strategic behavior can be exemplified from the perspective of information users or
producers. Unauthorized copying and distribution of information goods exemplifies the former.
The latter can be exemplified by anti-competitive behavior known as tying whereby information
producers require information users to purchase additional information (or non-information goods)

so as to be granted legal access to desired information. For further discussion, see Heverly, supra
note 47, at 1172-73, 1175-76.
183. Heverly, supra note 47, at 1169-70.
184. See id. at 1167.
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receives of her book.1 85 In this sense, the fair use provisions within IPR
might be thought of as the equivalent of an easement in real property in
that both private and common uses are better off for the existence of the
other. Heverly states that if we imagine that, from its inception,
Copernicus's "De Revolutionibus" was subject to pure private control to
the point where all common uses were prohibited, then we begin to
understand the importance of the dynamic interplay between private and
common uses of information. 16
Examples of laws that combat strategic behavior in the information
environment include the requirement that property rights in information
not be automatically perpetual, and the use of definitions that set the
boundaries of information protection such as where copyright law
protects particular expressions of information fixed in a tangible medium
without allowing ideas to be copyrighted. 8 7 Fair use provisions inherent
within copyright law provide yet another example of averting strategic
behavior since it protects common users' rights to use information to
criticize information owners, even in the face of the information owners'
explicit objection.18 8 The fair use provisions are in fact so fundamental
to the semicommons perspective of information that Heverly suggests
that information is in fact a natural semicommons because too much
change in the landscape of fair use, and the Supreme Court would reject
the changes based on the needs of the First Amendment. 9
Once it is accepted that IPRs create a property regime in
information, the application of the semicommons theory to the IPR
regime is readily achieved. The application of semicommons theory to
information does, however, entail a more detailed exposition of the
dynamic nature of the private and common uses of information than was
required for Smith's account of the semicommons in the open-field
system.1 90 This requisite exposition has typically been lacking due to the
fact that the efficiencies of the dynamic interaction between private and
185. Id.
186. Seeid.at 1171-72.
187. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985).
Note that Heverly discusses strategic behavior from both the information producer perspective and
the information user perspective. For example, "[a]nother method used to dissuade strategic
behaviour from a legal perspective is the use of enforcement actions by information owners. Where
information owners bring lawsuits for the unauthorized use of information, common users may
reduce their strategic behaviour." Heverly, supra note 47, at 1179. This paper focuses solely on
strategic behavior by the information producer.
188. See Heverly, supra note 47, at 1179-80.
189. Id. 1179-80 & n.140 (discussing Smith, Semicommon PropertyRights, supra note 8, at
165-67 n.124). See also Heverly, supranote 47, at 1179-80 n.195.
190. Heverly, supra note 47, at 1164-65.
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commons uses have largely been left out of the debates concerning
information ownership and regulation.' 9' Although a full cost-benefit
analysis of the information semicommons is beyond the scope of this
paper, it is important to recognize, as Heverly does, that in many
192
instances information does fall within a semicommons framework.
And that, in at least some instances, the information semicommons is
wealth-maximizing in that the private uses benefit the commons uses
and vice versa.
If Heverly's insights are coupled with Lessig's "code as law"
principle, it can be reasoned that when the regulation of information
tends from law to technology, the possibilities of realizing efficiencies
associated with a semicommons structure are removed from the costbenefit semicommons equation. 193 As such efficiencies are removed
from the equation, they simply disappear. Traveling full circle back to
Boyle's analysis, just as the environment disappeared, and just as the
public domain disappeared, so too the efficiencies related to the dynamic
interaction between private and commons uses has disappeared.
194
Of course, the idea of governance by architecture is not new.
Even under the traditional open-field system of medieval Europe the
semicommons was governed not just by law, but also by architecture and
technology. 95 Likewise, as Lessig has stressed, the information
environment is often bound to a greater extent by technology than
law. 196 Digital Rights Management (DRM) technology, such as DVD
CSS encoding, exemplifies this trend as it provides potentially absolute
bars against actions that private users consider strategic on the part of
common users.1 97 Technology manufacturers and information producers
cooperate, drawing upon DRM technology, to assure technological
protective measures are implemented so as to provide what is a strong,
effective, and inexpensive means of combating strategic behavior.
While undoubtedly the avoidance of strategic behavior is an
important aspect of semicommons theory, it is to be noted that the
simple avoidance of strategic behavior does not per se equate to

191. See id.
192. See id.
193. Id.; cf LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, at 24, 81-82 (2006) [hereinafter LESSIG,
CODE].
194. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICON WRITINGS 29-95 (Miran Bozovic ed., 1995).
195. See Smith, Semicommon Properly Rights, supra note 8, at 132.
196. LESSIG, CODE, supra note 193.

197. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 444 (2d Cir. 2001)
(holding that the DMCA anti-circumvention provisions prohibit circumvention of the DVD CSS).
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efficiency.' 98 The cost-benefit equation of the semicommons involves
weighing up the benefits that flow from the dynamic relationship
between private and commons uses and the costs of avoiding the
strategic behavior.' 99 If the focus remains on the avoidance of strategic
behavior without an acknowledgment of the benefits that flow from the
dynamic interaction between private and commons uses, then the
semicommons efficiency equation is unjustly skewed. It is this dynamic
that establishes a tragedy of great proportion: the tragedy of (ignoring)
the information semicommons.
V. CONCLUSION

This paper has made an important contribution to furthering the
employ of environmental analytical frameworks to IPR issues through
cultural environmental discourse. The broad nature of challenges arising
within the contemporary information environment, and the interaction
between these challenges and the IPR regime, makes it imperative to
employ and develop the analytical frameworks of cultural
The end goal is to diagnose and resolve
environmentalism. 200
contemporary information environment challenges.
After outlining the second enclosure movement critique 20' and the
emergent cultural environmental discourse, 2 this paper settled on the
analytical framework of the commons and related tragedy discourse
being the tragedy of the commons, the tragedy of the anticommons and
the tragedy of (ignoring) the information semicommons. 20 3 Through the
engagement of this tragedy discourse it was argued that it is critical that
IPR dialogue move beyond the commons/private dichotomy of property
ownership, toward a more mature dialogue that recognizes the
efficiencies that arise from the dynamic interaction between different
types of property ownership. 2 4 Indeed commons and private usages of
information need not be mutually exclusive, and can in fact be symbiotic
leading to mutual benefits.20 5
The paper submits, in closing, that Lessig's ideas relating to the
perpetual struggle between freedom and control within the information

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

See Heverly, supra note 47, at 1164.
Id.
Boyle, A Politics,supra note 25, at 109-111; supra PartIII.
Supra Part1.
Supra Part H.
Supra Part Ill.
Id.
Heverly, supranote 47, at 1169-70.
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environment2 0 6 might be best anointed through semicommons theory. It
is true that it is a vexed question as to how to determine whether
particular information resources should be private or public; free or
controlled; or rather whether information should display a combination
of ownership/regulation traits. Nevertheless, the struggle need not be
The tragedy of (ignoring) the
without purpose or achievement.
information semicommons is by no means inevitable and, indeed, if
appropriate institutional arrangements are struck the results may be truly
"comedic" in the classic sense of a happy outcome.2 °7

206. McShane, supra note 93, at 3.
207. Id.
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